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    ubmarine cables are critical links in the infrastructure that enables world-
wide communications. This article first examines the vital role that subma-
rine cables play and how communications reliability is maintained by cable 
traffic restoration and cable repair. The article then reviews international law 
within the context of submarine cable history and the evolution of cable 
technology. In Part II it discusses how international law, as codified in the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1884 Cable Convention, is central 
to the success of submarine cable communication. In Part III it provides 
examples of how key compromises codified in the Cable Convention can 
serve as a springboard to develop new techniques to protect submarine ca-
bles from hostile action by third parties and belligerents. Part IV addresses 
threats to the submarine cable system during peacetime. Part V discusses 
current vulnerabilities in the ability to repair cables during armed conflict and 
a recent initiative to address those vulnerabilities. This article concludes in 
Part VI by encouraging scholars and policy makers to propose, discuss, and 
debate these ideas. It suggests providing for improved cable route diversity, 
amending the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Navigation to include submarine cables and cable ships, and ac-
cording to cable ships an exemption from belligerent attack in wartime. 
 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBMARINE CABLES 
  
A.  Fiber Optic Submarine Cable Characteristics 
 
Submarine cables on the high seas are typically 17–22 mm in diameter—
about the diameter of a beer bottle cap. The cable is comprised of a high-
grade, marine-quality polyethylene tube with a core of steel wire for strength, 
a copper conductor to power acoustical optical amplifiers (repeaters), and 
glass fibers for communications. A single cable can have anywhere from six 
to over thirty-two fiber optic pairs. The light spectrum in a fiber is divided 
into numerous color spectrum wave bands. Each wave band transmits data 
independently and simultaneously, yielding a continuously increasing torrent 
of terabits of data traveling at the speed of light. There have been continuous 
exponential improvements in transmission capacity. For example, while the 














dom, Ireland, Canada, and the United States) can carry 2.5 terabits per sec-
ond, the 8-fiber pair “MAREA” cable laid in 2018 (connecting Spain and the 
United States) can carry 24 terabits per second.1  
Cables are chemically inert in the marine environment and have a small 
footprint.2 The power required for the cable is a constant direct current of 
about 0.6 to 1.0 amperes—less than the three amperes required for a mid-
range laptop computer.3 In territorial seas and exclusive economic zones 
where fishing and anchor threats are present, cables may be sheathed with 
high quality steel armor wiring. Additionally, cables in these waters may be 
buried to a seabed depth of one to three meters, depending upon the seabed 
sediment and the fishing threat. Extensive peer review scientific papers doc-
ument the benign impact of fiber optic cables in the marine environment.4  
 
B. Submarine Cable Traffic Restoration 
 
A basic understanding of what happens to restore the traffic carried on a 
submarine cable when the cable suffers a fault clarifies why submarine cables 
have a well-deserved peacetime recognition for communication resilience. 
With rare exception,5 this important topic is not addressed in peer reviewed 
literature. 
Restoration is the term used to describe the process of rerouting and 
restoring traffic on a submarine cable when the cable is down for mainte-
nance or when it has been disrupted by a fault that damages or cuts the cable. 
When a fault occurs, two actions are required. The first is restoration of the 
traffic and the second is the physical repair of the cable. Each process runs 
in parallel and is handled by different professionals employed by the cable 
owner. Restoration in peacetime normally takes place in seconds or minutes 
while the peacetime repair process takes days or weeks. Cable repair is im-
portant not only to get the damaged cable back in operation, but because 
each cable is a back-up for restoration of other cable systems. 
 
1. Submarine Cable Map 2021, TELEGRAPHY, https://submarine-cable-map-2021.tel-
egeography.com/. 
2. DOUGLAS BURNETT & LIONEL CARTER, INTERNATIONAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND 
BIODIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 29–30 (2017). 
3. Id. at 53. 
4. Id. at 63–71 (references include about forty-four books, papers, and studies address-
ing various environmental aspects of submarine cables). 
5. Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does It Work?, in SUBMARINE CABLES: 












Before fiber optic cables were used, restoration of submarine cables was 
carried out by using other cables or by satellite. With the advent of fiber optic 
cables, restoration by satellite is no longer practical. Moreover, major com-
mercial customers in their contracts with cable owner specify that restoration 
must be by other fiber optic cables. 
In many respects, restoration is the “secret sauce” for submarine cable 
resiliency. For example, if a transatlantic cable is cut, in milliseconds the traf-
fic is rerouted to other transatlantic cables. If those are not available, traffic 
is rerouted to U.S.-Brazil cables and then across the South Atlantic to Africa 
and north to Europe, and if these are not available then across the Pacific 
Ocean to Asia landings and thence across the Indian Ocean to the Mediter-
ranean Ocean to Europe, typically all in seconds or minutes. Restoration like 
this is normal and functions well unless large numbers of cables are knocked 
out at the same time by major natural disasters or belligerent actions. The 
situation will be dramatically aggravated if similar events simultaneously 
compromise multiple cables in more than one ocean.  
Cable systems are designed with restoration features. One older solution 
is to design a self-healing ring cable system where one system has two 
roughly parallel transoceanic cables joined at either end by land or submarine 
cable to form a ring. In the event of a fault on one leg of the cable, the traffic 
is immediately rerouted back around using the other leg of the ring with no 
delay or cost. “TAT-14,” taken out of service in December 2020 after a 
twenty-year service life, is an example of a self-healing ring submarine cable 
system. 
Ring architecture is being replaced by point-to-point “mesh” architec-
ture that allows cable traffic to be restored on any cable in which the cable 
owner has capacity ownership or an indefeasible right of use agreement. This 
avoids having to build two cables in parallel and provides greater redundancy 
and flexibility.  
Restoration nowadays is largely controlled by revolutionary automatic 
switches that, when triggered by a cable fault, automatically reroute traffic in 
milliseconds to other transoceanic cable paths. A cable system also normally 
has a restoration liaison officer to plan restoration with cable design engi-
neers, conduct exercises with other systems, and handle restorations when 
the need arises from a cable fault or repair on a 24/7 basis. Cable systems 
may differentiate the costs of services provided to their customers based in 
part on the degree and speed of restoration specified in the relevant contract. 
This is particularly true for cable owner customers that use the cable system 











Cable systems have a 24/7 network operations center (NOC) to monitor 
traffic and identify any disruption to the traffic or a change in the normal 
operating conditions of the marine portion of their network. The NOC 
monitors automatic switching and alerts the restoration liaison officer for 
restoration contingencies and the maintenance authority for repair.  
There are three restoration options. The first option is self-restoration. 
Self-restoration allows a cable owner to restore traffic automatically on other 
cables where it owns capacity or fiber pairs. This approach is known as a 
“mesh.” Cable content providers and “hyperscalers”6 like Google and Face-
book are designing their global systems to be entirely restored to the maxi-
mum extent possible on their own fiber pairs in other systems they co-own. 
Their goal is to keep connectivity between their server farms and allow the 
“cloud” to function without interruption. Traditional telecom companies 
such as AT&T and BT Group (formerly British Telecom) have a different 
goal of keeping their direct customers in communication around the world. 
This dichotomy in goals between the cable content providers and the tele-
com companies is a new phenomenon. How these approaches will work in 
cases of multiple cable failures, especially in more than one ocean, is an open 
question. 
In modern fiber optic cable systems extra or spare capacity is reserved 
for restoration or future capacity needs. Capacity in cables actively being 
used (called “lit” cables) is immediately available for restoration if the cable 
is fully equipped. Some analysts fail to calculate that only equipped lit capac-
ity counts for timely restoration. To be considered equipped, the terminal 
equipment must have the circuit cards installed to send and receive the newly 
activated lit capacity and be fitted with adequate power and cooling equip-
ment in the terminal cable station to handle the increased use. Equipping lit 
capacity is expensive and time consuming if it is not already installed. A new 
circuit card alone may take four to six months to order from a manufacturer. 
Add to that the engineering implementation, testing, and procedures re-
quired—it is not an automatic process. The result is that only a fraction of 
lit capacity is equipped as cable system operators carefully measure how 
much lit capacity they need for business reasons. When an active cable sys-
tem has unused or spare dark or unlit fibers, there are major expenses and 
 
6. Hyperscaler is a term used in the cable industry to refer to companies that operate 
data centers. Hyperscale computing is necessary to build a robust and scalable cloud, big 
data, map reduce, or distributed storage system and is often associated with the infrastruc-












time required to bring these dark fibers into operation. The decision to equip 
and activate the dark fibers to carry traffic is a carefully made business deci-
sion and not one readily available in an emergency. 
The second option is through mutual restoration agreements with other 
cable systems. In these arrangements—negotiated by the restoration liaison 
officer—a cable owner agrees that in the event of a fault or repair on a cable 
system under the arrangement, traffic will be restored on the cable system 
not impacted by the fault. Normally, mutual restoration agreements are per-
formed at no cost on a reciprocal basis. 
A third option is an ad hoc commercial arrangement where a cable sys-
tem sells restoration services to other cable systems at a posted or negotiated 
market price. This type of arrangement is largely replaced by the first two 
restoration options but may still be used if the first two options, for whatever 
reason, are not up to the task.  
Restoration may combine the various restoration options to give a cable 
system the required reliability. An important restoration objective is to pro-
vide protection and flexibility by spreading traffic among various cable sys-
tem “baskets” instead of placing most or all of the traffic “eggs” in one or 
two baskets.  
In a scenario where large numbers of cables are out of service during 
wartime or major natural disasters, the normal peacetime restoration process 
would be seriously challenged if not overtaxed. There are several reasons for 
this vulnerability. 
First, unlike historic industry practice, modern mesh restoration is han-
dled by each company using its owned or indefeasible right of use capacity 
in the various cable systems in which it has interests. As a result, there is only 
limited spare equipped capacity to receive restoration traffic from other cable 
systems. 
Second, the division of cable system owners into hyperscalers or content 
providers and traditional telecom companies introduces different business 
models that directly impact restoration. A hyperscaler is focused on service 
between its server farms that form its cloud services, not the end customers. 
The traditional telecom company is focused on its end customers. Unlike the 
traditional telecom companies, the hyperscaler is not disposed or practiced 
in allowing third parties to use its systems for restoration. Hyperscalers that 
are responsible for the newest submarine cables may have optical amplifiers 
and equipment that is not conducive to ad hoc additions of restoration ca-











Third, in a wartime situation, where large numbers of cables are dam-
aged, a likely scenario will be numerous cable owners trying to compete for 
the limited restoration capacity available on the surviving cable systems. This 
ad hoc impact will likely be chaotic as each company makes decisions about 
which traffic has priority over other traffic and national governments strug-
gle to do likewise with priorities on a national scale. 
 In terms of global resilience for submarine cables, the more diverse the 
paths, the better. Route diversity should be welcomed, encouraged, and fa-
cilitated by national governments. Many times, this is not the case because 
of conflicts with other seabed users like offshore wind and fishing; misplaced 
environmental concerns surrounding marine protected areas; and compla-
cent and “stove piped” government permitting authorities that do not con-
sider the international restoration picture. 
It is emphasized that there is no government requirement to restore traf-
fic if a cable is disrupted. The pressure and requirement to provide restora-
tion are driven commercially by the cable system’s customers or server farm 
connectivity, and its market competition. Sophisticated buyers of capacity in 
their agreements have terms dealing with the speed, cost, means, and relia-
bility of restoration. Premium paid restoration options allow a customer to 
ensure its traffic has priority over other user traffic. If a cable system does 
not meet these contractual terms, its customers will contract with other, 
more reliable or cost-effective cable systems. This approach works quite well 
in a normal peacetime environment, but the question remains if it works 
when large numbers of cables are damaged at the same time. 
 
C. Contemporaneous Submarine Cable Usage and Reliance 
 
International submarine cables, which vary between 131 kilometers and 
20,000 kilometers in length, lie on the sea bottom at depths as much as 9,912 
meters (exceeding Mt. Everest’s height), do not enjoy automatic protection 
or immunity from peacetime theft or intentional disruption or from hostile 
actions during wartime. 
Before delving into international law, a hard look is in order at just how 
dependent countries around the world are on submarine cables. As many 
may know, but not often think about, submarine cables enable us to connect 
with family, friends, businesses, and even online events like the Disruptive 
Technologies and International Law Conference hosted virtually by the U.S. 
Naval War College in December 2020, where this article was presented to a 











Consider that, without cables, no one would be able to FaceTime, Skype, 
Zoom, or communicate internationally on the Internet, whether by video, 
data, or voice. All such means of communications would stop abruptly if the 
services provided by submarine cables were disrupted. 
Unfortunately, satellites do not serve as an effective substitute. The pop-
ular belief that modern communications are satellite-driven has not been ac-
curate since the first transoceanic fiber optic cable, TAT-8, was laid across 
the Atlantic in 1988.  
In fact, in 2007—the year the author testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on submarine cables and the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—if all the submarine cables connecting the 
United States to other nations had been cut, using every single satellite in the 
sky would have resulted in only seven percent of the U.S. traffic having been 
restored.7 The same exercise today would undoubtedly lower this percent. 
An analysis today estimates that only 0.37 percent of U.S. international traffic 
is currently carried by satellite.8  
Why? Because the capacity of a single transatlantic cable has increased 
by a factor of one hundred thousand in twenty-five years. About fifty-four 
of these cables—each with a diameter the width of a garden hose—provide 
the United States with over 99 percent of its international communications. 
Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and a host of other nations 
are similarly situated in their reliance on cables. Submarine cables connect 
land-based server farms across the globe, underscoring that the “cloud” is 
beneath the sea.9 Even the server farms may be heading to sea, as demon-
strated by Microsoft’s experimental submerged data center, which was 
housed in a sealed storage capsule that was retrieved in summer 2020 from 
the seafloor near Scotland’s Orkney Islands.10  
 
7. Hearing on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 110th Cong. 145 (2007) (testimony of Douglas Burnett). 
8. Submarine Cable Map 2021, supra note 1 (“Statistics released by U.S. Federal Com-
munications Commission indicate that satellites account for just 0.37% of all U.S. interna-
tional capacity”). 
9. BURNETT & CARTER, supra note 2, at 3. 
10. Mike Clare, Successful Deployment of An Underwater Data Centre, INTERNATIONAL CA-
BLE PROTECTION COMMITTEE ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, Oct. 2020, at 3–4. The 12.2 meter 
long, 3.2 meter diameter, pressurized capsule, powered by renewable energy sources, held 
855 on-board servers that had a server failure rate one-eighth of a land-based center over 











Consider the massive investment in submarine cables in the last decade 
by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Amazon.11 As former Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, and former Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General James Amos, note, “Cyberspace, in the physical form 
of undersea fiber-optic cables,” carries a greater value of trade, through fi-
nancial transactions and information, than the value of goods carried at sea.12  
Indeed, each day, the Society for Worldwide Internet Financial Telecom-
munications transmits about fifteen million messages representing about 
four trillion dollars daily to more than 8,300 banking organizations, securities 
institutions, and corporate customers in 208 countries. Consider this state-
ment made by Stephen Malphrus when he was the Chief Information Of-
ficer with the United States Federal Reserve, “When the communication [ca-
ble] networks go down, the financial sector does not grind to a halt, it snaps 
to a halt.”13 
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, in the 
Oceans and Law of the Sea Report, wrote “Functioning as the backbone of 
the international telecommunications system, submarine cables are a funda-
mental component of the critical global infrastructure and play a direct role 
in sustainable industrialization; indirectly they contribute to all other areas 
recognized as important for sustainable development.”14  
In 2020, that “backbone” can be measured by the scope of demand on 
international fiber optic telecommunication cables—estimated to involve 
four billion people, four trillion dollars in revenue opportunity, over twenty-
five million applications, more than twenty-five billion embedded and intel-
ligent systems, and fifty trillion gigabits of data.15 This fact is astonishing 
given the garden hose diameter of an individual cable. 
 
11. Id. at 5–6. 
12. Jonathan Greenert & James Amos, A New Naval Era, PROCEEDINGS, June 2013, at 
17. 
13. Stephen Malphrus, Chief of Staff, Federal Reserve Board, Speech at ROGUCCI 
Conference (Oct. 19, 2009), quoted in Threats to Undersea Communications Cables 6 (Sept. 28, 
2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/1---2017-AEP-Threats-to-Undersea-
Cable-Communications.pdf. 
14. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea Report, ¶¶ 53, 55, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/74 (Mar. 30, 2015).  
15. Mario Morales, Vice-President, IDC Research Inc., Presentation in the TeleGeog-












During the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Cable Protection 
Committee16 estimates that Internet traffic increased between 25 and 50 per-
cent between November 2019 and the early stages of lockdown in April 
2020.17 Zoom Video Communications revenue for the quarter ending July 
31, 2020, saw a 355 percent increase compared to the previous year.18  
 Given the above facts, I phrase the former U.N. Secretary-General’s 
words in a slightly different way: Fiber optic submarine cables, in and of 
themselves, constitute—by any standard—critical international infrastruc-
ture. By understanding that truth, international scholars and policy experts 
should grasp the importance of the following nine facts in navigating inter-
national law and in proposing solutions to protect submarine cables:  
1. Approximately 464 separate international cable systems use 1,245 ca-
ble landing stations and about 1.4 million km of fiber optic cables.19 
2. Ninety-nine percent of these cables are not government-owned. Each 
cable system is generally owned by separate consortiums of about four to 
forty private companies or entities, or occasionally by a single company. 
There is no worldwide submarine cable network any more than there is a 
world airline network; rather, independent individual cable systems freely 
cooperate and compete 24/7 year-round, with virtually no international gov-
ernance, and with what most of us perceive to be a seamless fit. The world’s 
subsea communication systems are provided by free enterprise at no charge 
to States! 
3. Cables, unlike ships, are not flagged to any one State—nor is the na-
tionality of the cable a simple question. Legal ownership of a cable is logically 
divided among the various co-owners, resulting in a legal kaleidoscope of 
jurisdictions and nationalities.  
 
16. The International Cable Protection Committee is a non-governmental organization 
made up principally by the companies that own and operate the world’s submarine cable 
systems and the cable ships that lay and maintain them. See generally International Cable Pro-
tection Committee, www.iscpc.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2021). 
17. Press Release, International Cable Protection Committee, ICPC Calls on Govern-
ments and Industry to Facilitate and Expedite Submarine Cable Installation and Repair Dur-
ing the COVID-19 Pandemic to Protect Internet Connectivity and Critical Communications 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://iscpc.org/news/; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law 
of the Sea Report, ¶ 8, U.N. /Doc. A/75/340 (Sept. 9, 2020). 
18. Zoom Video Communications Revenue 2019–2021, MACROTRENDS, https://www.ma-
crotrends.net/stock/charts/ZM/zoom-video-communications/revenue (last visited Nov. 
26, 2021). 
19. SUBMARINE CABLE ALMANAC, Nov. 2020, https://issuu.com/subtel-











4. Cable repair is organized regionally by private contract—subject to no 
applicable government mandates. Repairs are carried out strictly by contract 
terms, and not according to any national government priority. 
5. Cable repair ships are contractually obligated to sail from their base 
port within twenty-four hours of notification for fast repair response. 
6. Fifty or so cable ships operate worldwide.20 Half are on standby await-
ing a repair call out. The other half are laying new cables. 
7. Cable ships are custom built, conspicuous, expensive, and carry spe-
cialized crews trained at sea through “hawespipe” experience. These ships 
fly diverse national flags (e.g., United Kingdom, France, Marshall Islands, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, and China). 
8. Cable repairs are urgent—each cable system serves as the backup for 
other cables that need repair. 
9. The environmental footprint of cables on the seabed is benign.21 Once 
a cable is laid, it is designed to remain undisturbed unless it needs repair. The 
typical manufacturer warranty of twenty to twenty-five years is not based on 
the cable itself, but on the optical amplifier (repeater) that reenergizes the 
light, placed every sixty to eighty kilometers in the cable.  
While this article concentrates on fiber optic telecommunication cables, 
other types of submarine cables traverse—with increasing frequency—the 
world’s oceans. Military cables are used for acoustic sensing and antisubma-
rine warfare.22 More than an estimated twelve hundred scientific cables pro-
vide continuous streams of environmental data that advances our under-
standing of the oceans.23 Finally, advances in technology also open the door 
to international electrical power cables, such as the 580 km, 700 megavolt 
 
20. Rebecca Spence, Where in the World Are Those Pesky Cable Ships, SUBMARINE TELE-
COMS FORUM, Nov. 16, 2020, at 15 (full-service cable ships capable of high seas operation 
involving laying and repair). 
21. See generally Burnett & Carter, supra note 2; Lionel Carter, Submarine Cables and Natural 
Hazards, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 
237. 
22. J. Ashley Roach, Military Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLICY, supra note 5, at 330, 340. 











high voltage direct current “NordNed” cable linking Norway to the Nether-
lands24 and the planned 1000 km, 1200 megavolt high voltage direct current 
“Icelink” cable between Iceland and the United Kingdom.25 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Military, power, and scientific submarine cables have distinct uses and vary 
by design and construction, but, under international law, they enjoy the same 
rights and obligations as those relied on for telecommunications. The growth 
and success of submarine cables—whatever the type—are intrinsically tied 
to the protections provided to international cables under international law. 
And, that impressive growth—fueled by the endless ingenuity expressed in 
cable design, installation, and maintenance—historically depends upon the 
freedoms to lay and repair submarine cables under international law in an 
unregulated space outside of territorial seas. 
 
A. Historical Treaty Development 
 
From the time submarine cables were launched in the nineteenth century, 
technology disruption inflicted by third parties and resulting from natural 
causes posed central concerns for diplomats and ocean policy makers. 
The first transoceanic submarine telegraph cable was laid in 1866 by the 
entrepreneur Cyrus Field.26 It was as revolutionary then as the Internet was 
for us when it was launched in the 1990s. The significance of the then-new 
technology was captured by the famed English jurist Sir Travers Twiss in 
1880: 
 
The preliminary question, which deserves consideration is whether the 
maintenance of telegraphic sea-cables, which have an international im-
portance, is an interest of the highest order of States, analogous to the in-
terest of the public health and of the public revenue, which each nation is 
allowed by courtesy to protect beyond the strict limits of its territorial wa-
ters. 
 
24. Malcolm Eccles et al., Submarine Power Cables, in id. at 299, 303. 
25. Jemima Kelly & Nerijus Adomaitis, Giant Iceland-UK Power Cable Plan Seen Facing 
Brexit Delay, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-iceland-
power-idUKKCN12L1O5. 
26. Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HAND-











If we look to the public services which the telegraphic sea-cable is now 
called upon to perform in time of peace, that it has become the normal 
instrument of communication between Governments and their envoys in 
foreign countries; that international treaties are from time to time con-
cluded between the nations of the two hemispheres through the medium 
of telegraphs; that through the same instrumentality approaching tempests 
are announced in advance to Europe from America, by which great dam-
ages and destruction to life and shipping may be averted; that no great 
criminal can now hope to escape from Europe to the western shores of the 
Atlantic Ocean with the fruits of his crime without a telegram anticipating 
his arrival, when he finds himself the captive of the law at the moment 
when he expect to set his foot upon a land of liberty: 
. . .the answer to the question above stated must, we think, be in the 
affirmative, and there can be no doubt that the great arterial lines of tele-
graphs have become indispensable for the circulation of the political life 
blood so necessary to maintain the vitality of our modern international 
State System.27 
 
If one substitutes “fiber-optic cables” and “email or text message” for 
the words “telegraphic sea-cables” and “telegram,” respectively, all must 
agree that Sir Travers’ words are as relevant today as they were in 1880. Fur-
ther, Sir Travers’ “affirmative” to the question about the critical nature of 
“sea-cable” maintenance found results in the pioneering 1884 International 
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables.28  
The 1884 Cable Convention constitutes the world’s very first law of the 
sea convention. It was the product of two summers of negotiations in Paris 
in 1882 and 1884 that reunited not only diplomats, but also fishermen, naval 
officers, and electrical engineers, all striving to devise a legal regime that ad-
dressed about twenty years of the world’s experience with the revolutionary 
new international submarine telegraph cables. The result is a series of com-
promises that form the bedrock of modern international law on submarine 
cables, as reflected in UNCLOS29 and the International Regulations for Pre-
venting Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).30  
 
27. Travers Twiss, Submarine Telegraph Cables, 49 THE NAUTICAL MAGAZINE 879, 883–
84 (1880). 
28. Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, T.S. 
380 (entered into force May 1, 1888) [hereinafter Cable Convention]. 
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
30. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 











Examining the evolution of how international law affects submarine ca-
bles is instructive as one considers ways to avert potential disruptions to this 
vital infrastructure. Toward that end, I summarize below the key compro-
mises that are codified in the Cable Convention, as they may provide ideas 
for new or updated techniques to avoid disruptions:  
1. All States and their nationals enjoy the freedom to lay and repair cables 
outside of what was then the three-nautical mile territorial sea.31 
2. Ships that damage a submarine cable because of intentional actions or 
culpable negligence are to be subject to criminal penalties of fines and im-
prisonment without prejudice to the cable owner’s right to recover civil dam-
ages. From the start, cables had been cut or damaged from fishing activity 
and anchor contacts, and these provisions were designed to punish and deter 
not only intentional but negligent actions. Under the treaty, there is an ex-
emption from criminal and civil actions if the master damaged the cable to 
save the ship and its passengers. An example would be a ship, losing power 
and being driven onto the rocks, on which a crew member throws out an 
anchor to prevent the allision, but damages a cable. 32 
3. If a vessel, through no fault of its own, snags a cable with its fishing 
gear or anchor, the vessel is to sacrifice its gear or anchor to avoid injury to 
the cable. If the sacrifice is made, the cable owner is required to indemnify 
the vessel for the sacrificed gear or anchor. Here the priority of the Cable 
Convention was to prevent the greater harm of communication disruption.33 
4. A cable owner enjoying the freedom to lay cables can cross other ca-
bles without permission. If in the process of crossing a cable, that cable is 
damaged, the crossing cable owner must indemnify the owner of the crossed 
cable for the cost of repairs.34 
5. If a cable ship displays day shapes (i.e., masthead signals showing ves-
sel status) or night lights indicating it is engaged in laying or repairing a sub-
marine cable, other ships are to stay one nautical mile distance from the cable 
 
31. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 1, with UNCLOS, supra note 29, arts. 
87, 112. 
32. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, arts. 2, 8–12, with UNCLOS, supra note 
29, art. 113. 
33. Compare Cable Convention, supra note 28, art. 7, with UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 
115. 












ship and one quarter mile from any cable repair buoy and avoid actions that 
interfere with the cable laying or repair.35 
Two provisions of the Cable Convention not reflected in UNCLOS 
stand out. The Cable Convention contains a provision that allows a party 
from a warship to board a vessel suspected of damaging a submarine cable.36 
This provision was relied upon by a U.S. Navy destroyer in 1959 to board a 
Soviet trawler on the high seas to obtain evidence of the ship having cut 
several transatlantic cables.37  
 
B. State Practice 
 
The Cable Convention also states that nothing in it “affect[s] the liberty of 
action of the belligerents.”38 State practice is solidly consistent with freedom 
of action against cables by belligerents. In 1914, a German Navy cruiser 
(SMS Emden) destroyed a British cable station at Fanning Island in the Cen-
tral Pacific.39 In 1918, a German submarine (U-151), outfitted with a cutting 
device, severed cables between New York and Nova Scotia and New York 
and Panama.40 Another German submarine (U-156), on July 21, 1918, re-
portedly was attempting to cut a cable between Massachusetts and France 
when it was spotted and attacked by two flying boats.41 Britain’s first naval 
acts of war in World Wars I and II were to have ships sever telegraph cables 
linking Germany to the Americas.42 Particularly noteworthy is the action of 
the British cable ship Alert in 1914, severing five German cables from Ger-
many to the Azores and the United States. This act deprived Germany of 
secure communications outside of Europe, allowing British codebreakers to 
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read German signals to their embassies, including the famous Zimmerman 
Telegram43 whose publication helped push the United States into war with 
Germany. 
If the current Russian naval order of battle with ships and submarines 
designed to attack international cables is any indication, one can safely as-
sume that State practice recognizing freedom of action by belligerents con-
tinues unabated.44  
There is one legal case where a submarine cable’s legal status in war was 
the issue. Following the Spanish American War, Great Britain brought a 
claim on behalf of English owners of the cable connecting Spain to its colo-
nies in the Americas that the U.S. Navy cut. A 1923 international arbitration 
tribunal ruled that while Great Britain was neutral in the war between the 
United States and Spain, the fact that the submarine telegraph cables trans-
mitted military information between Spain and its colonies made these cables 
legitimate military targets. No compensation was owed by the United States 
to Great Britain.45 
A tenuous step was made to protect international cables in wartime in 
Article 54 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws of War on Land: “Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory 
with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in case of 
absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed 
when peace is made.”46 This provision is obsolete and impracticable because 
the concept of a neutral cable is meaningless in terms of modern submarine 
cable usage, interconnectivity between cable systems, and diverse opaque ca-
ble ownership structures. Moreover, even if the weak Article 54 was to be 
embraced by State practice—which it has not—it still allows for destroying 
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neutral cables between occupied and neutral territories if a belligerent sees a 
need.  
The lessons of the 1923 arbitration case, along with the State wartime 
practice precedent for modern submarine cables, prove telling. As the noted 
law of the sea scholar James Kraska concludes in a recent article, “the tech-
nology of the global cable system, and customary law reflected in state prac-
tice, suggest that belligerent states would use or even destroy neutral subma-
rine cables during armed conflict.”47 Professor Kraska is right for two rea-
sons: First, cables, unlike ships, have no flag to confirm their national iden-
tity. Legally, ownership of cables reflects many jurisdictions, such that in a 
global wartime situation, it is likely that one or more of the part owners is a 
belligerent. That alone would justify treating the cables as legitimate military 
targets. Second, following the logic of the 1923 arbitration case, the traffic 
on modern fiber optic cables undoubtedly carries communications of one or 
more of the belligerents. The continuously flowing gigabit-rich slurry of data 
packages transmitted at the speed of light over modern cables contain mili-
tary, diplomatic, government, and economic data. Such traffic is transferred 
or switched to other cables in fractions of a second. This undeniable cable 
usage, regardless of cable “nationality,” makes the cable a legitimate military 
target. 
 
IV. NON-WARTIME INTENTIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST                          
SUBMARINE CABLES 
 
Even in peacetime, the evidence highlights noticeable gaps in submarine ca-
ble security.  
• In November 2007, intentional sabotage of a cable landing in Bang-
ladesh disabled communication for over a week.48 
• Cable segment thefts took place in Jamaica in 2008.49 
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• In 2010 terrorists attacked a cable station disrupting a cable linking 
the Philippines and Japan.50 
• In March 2013 sixteen tons of submarine cable in the seabed be-
tween Banka Island and the Riau Islands in Indonesia was stolen.51 
• The same month, three men were arrested by the Egyptian coast 
guard attempting to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 cable system.52 
• In July 2013, 31.7 km of cable linking Indonesia and Singapore was 
stolen.53 
The author’s personal experience with cable theft dates to March 23, 
2007, when at least two ships were involved in the high seas removal of 
ninety-eight kilometers of cable from the TVH cable system and seventy-
nine kilometers of cable from the APCN cable system. Both incidents in-
cluded the removal of critical optical amplifiers. At the time, these cables 
constituted Vietnam’s entire cable connections to the rest of the world. A 
cable repair ship arrived on the scene and photographed one of the ships in 
the act of removing cable. The Indonesia Marine security team on the cable 
ship declined to intervene because their orders were to provide defensive 
protection and not to take offensive action. The repairs took over three 
months because a French factory had to be restarted to produce optical am-
plifier replacements.54 
As these events were unfolding, the author was at a conference in Balti-
more. International Cable Protection Committee leadership, including 
AT&T (United States), BT (United Kingdom), and Southern Cross (Aus-
tralia), quickly convened an ad hoc meeting to analyze what were unmistak-
able and near simultaneous high seas attacks by two separate vessels on two 
different cable systems. Assignments were made to contact respective na-
tional defense and security agencies. It fell to the author to notify the United 
States Navy and Coast Guard. Telephone briefs were provided over several 
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days. It became apparent that the notification was discussed in high level 
briefings, but at the end of the day, no visible actions were taken.  
 This experience underscores a telling feature of national governance of 
critical international submarine cable infrastructure. Many agencies own part 
of the submarine cable puzzle, but no agency is in charge. In the United 
States, approximately twenty-one government agencies regulate some as-
pects of submarine cables. This situation—multiple agencies with no agreed 
lead—creates a major security shortcoming when cable systems are under 
attack or multiple systems are impacted by a natural disaster, such as a major 
tsunami or earthquake.55 
Although not the result of a natural disaster, a reef abrasion in July 2015 
caused a cable break, rupturing the island of Saipan’s connectivity with the 
rest of the world and demonstrating the havoc that can be wrought by a 
technology disruption. At that time, Saipan depended upon a single fiber 
optic cable. Normally, a single cable break would not be an issue. Worldwide, 
an average of two hundred cable breaks, resulting from both man-made and 
natural causes, occur each year. Participating in a maintenance agreement 
provides for prompt repair and restoration—supplied by cable ships—al-
lowing traffic to be rerouted in seconds so that consumers experience no 
impact. In Saipan, however, to save expenses the cable operator did not par-
ticipate in a maintenance agreement and the local government had allowed 
back-up microwave communication facilities to atrophy. Contingency plan-
ning, if it existed, was not practiced by the local government and communi-
cation company. Thus, the island had greatly diminished international com-
munications for over two months, until the $2 million repair could be com-
pleted. During this time, airlines resorted to visual flight rules to land, tour-
ism collapsed, and residents were unable to use credit cards and automated 
teller machines to pay for food and other purchases at stores.56  
Imagine the chaos, panic, and disruption that would ensue in major na-
tions if a similar scenario played out where multiple cables were cut, as one 
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writer expressed in an article entitled, Forget Nuclear Weapons, Cutting Undersea 
Cables Could Decisively End a War.57 
Well-respected legal scholar Robert Beckman highlights the gap in inter-
national law with respect to protecting submarine cables from intentional 
actions carried out beyond territorial seas.58 Beckman coined the phrase, 
“Submarine cables are the orphans of international law.” He correctly notes 
that no applicable international treaty exists to deal with attacks on subma-
rine cables outside of territorial seas by terrorist or “grey” forces. The Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (together called the “SUA Conven-
tions”)59 cover aircraft, ships, offshore platforms, and navigational aids, but 
are silent on cables.  
The October 30, 2020, seizure of the tanker Nave Andromeda in the Eng-
lish Channel by special boat squadron commandos responding to a master’s 
SOS because stowaways were threatening control of the vessel is a textbook 
case of SUA Convention action.60 It can also serve, by way of comparison, 
as an illustration that no international law covers peacetime cable attacks 
outside of territorial seas, even though few dispute how critical cables are to 
international economies and State relationships. Beckman’s call to amend 
the SUA Conventions to include submarine cables is common sense; a solu-
tion to respond to this critical need is long overdue.  
We find a similar situation with respect to the wartime protection of sub-
marine cables. Neither international law nor State practice affords any pro-
tection to international submarine cables. The likelihood that UNCLOS or 
the Cable Convention might be amended to provide such protection seems 
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remote. The only attempt to protect cables in wartime by treaty was in 1866 
and it failed. The subsequent Cable Convention flatly rejected the concept.61 
 
V. CABLE SHIP SECURITY FLEET 
  
A critical element of national security is the availability of cable ships to re-
pair cables in wartime. In the case of widespread hostilities and contested 
oceans, there is a strong likelihood that the peacetime arrangements for re-
pairing cables will founder. For one thing, cable ship maintenance agree-
ments contain force majeure clauses that excuse performance of cable ships 
in the event of war involving the flag State or major global powers. Even if 
the agreements were to be observed, the normal peacetime call out proce-
dures such as the customary “first come, first serve” cable repair priority and 
shared international consensus decision making practices would be over-
whelmed in a chaotic situation with multiple damaged submarine cables and 
multiple cable owners or national governments requesting priority for their 
cables. Also, crews will be reluctant to sail in contested waters where the 
cable ships would be likely targets. Polyglot crewing with divided national 
loyalties adds complexity to manning and operating ships in wartime condi-
tions. Finally, cable ship owners will not risk their ships without adequate 
and affordable war risk insurance or national guarantees to replace sunk, 
damaged, or captured cable ships, and assume liability for breaking existing 
maintenance contracts and other damages associated with hostilities. 
Recognition of these reasons was central to recent U.S. government ac-
tion. An innovative solution to the lack of U.S. flag cable ships in wartime 
or national emergency is the Cable Security Fleet (CSF),62 implemented in 
the second half of 2021. The CSF provides for two U.S. flag cable ships to 
be accepted into this new critical infrastructure protection program. Each 
cable ship operator receives a $5 million stipend annually, provided the cable 
ship meets the statutory and related contractual requirements. The annual 
stipend is designed to partially compensate the cable ship owner for the in-
creased cost of using a U.S. citizen crew and complying with the require-
ments for a ship to fly the U.S. flag. A U.S. flag ship allows a highly trained 
U.S. merchant marine crew to fulfill its traditional mission of delivering ser-
vice “in peacetime, in wartime, every time.” The CSF requirements include 
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compliance with the terms established by agreement with the Maritime Ad-
ministration (MARAD), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)—es-
sentially guaranteed availability of a cable ship and crew on twenty-four 
hours’ notice following a national emergency declaration and entering a con-
tingency contract with a federal operating authority for wartime operations. 
CSF provides the U.S. government with not only U.S. flag cable ships, but 
experienced U.S. crews, access to commercial spares (cable, amplifiers/re-
peaters, universal joint kits, etc.), the cable owner’s marine depots worldwide, 
and the ability to leverage the cable owner’s working relationships with other 
cable ship owners and operators, survey companies, and vendors worldwide.  
The seemingly solid arguments that submarine cables are considered uni-
versally as critical international infrastructure, including the means to lay and 
repair cables, and the strong endorsement by all national security agencies 
were not enough to sway some senior DOT officials. Congress recognized 
the compelling needs and acted. The DOT opposition by senior officials is 
tied to bureaucratic complacency, outdated concepts of modern technology 
and potential disruptive impacts, and a Luddite view that protection of cables 
is not important or is a problem for others since transporting data is not 
something for DOT’s concern. Even though the Secretary of Transporta-
tion63 directed DOT civil servants to stop delaying implementation of the 
law enacted and funded by Congress, the opposition to CSF continues in a 
new administration as DOT and the Office of Management and Budget con-
tinue to oppose MARAD budget support for this critical program. 
 
VI. WHAT IS NEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND                                   
FIBER OPTIC SUBMARINE CABLES 
 
The traditional freedoms of navigation and laying and maintaining subma-
rine cables are firmly documented in international treaties and customary in-
ternational law and should not be diluted. If anything, these freedoms should 
be publicly recognized and reinforced. Encouraging more diverse cable 
paths with streamlined national landing regulation provides added resilience 
by timely creating more “secret sauce” of multiple paths for restoration when 
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cables are cut. The current arguments by well-intentioned environmental and 
world government advocates to establish area-based management and inter-
national regulatory control of the world’s cable industry in waters outside of 
territorial seas and beyond national jurisdiction compromises one of human-
kind’s greatest and most remarkable technological achievements. Route di-
versity based on private industry market initiatives, innovation, financing, 
and operation best serves the world in peacetime and wartime. 
States should work to close the glaring gap that omits third parties, grey 
zone actors,64 and terrorists from the SUA Conventions by amending the 
Conventions to add submarine cables and cable ships to the protection cur-
rently provided to ships, aircraft, offshore structures, and navigational aids. 
To ameliorate the wartime situation, an idea that perhaps merits further 
study involves according to cable repair ships an exemption from attack. 
Such an initiative would be modeled on the wartime protection under inter-
national law for hospital ships.65 Cable ships already enjoy peacetime protec-
tion from navigation interference when they are laying and repairing cables. 
To facilitate that protection, this small class of ships ensure that they are 
visually conspicuous66 by carrying special lights and day shapes. During war-
time, further protection methods—like those applied to hospital vessels un-
der international law—could be devised for cable ships in terms of unen-
crypted communications, public voyage routing disclosure, weapons limita-
tions, and unmistakable ship markings. This modest step contributes to 
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achieving two objectives: the restoration of vital fiber optic telecommunica-
tion infrastructure and the fostering of valid humanitarian objectives.  
One can argue that the challenge with this idea is the reality—previously 
described in this article—that modern fiber optic cables carry traffic that di-
rectly or indirectly benefits belligerents. A counterargument could be that 
massive attacks on submarine cables would incur the need to repair and re-
store communications that are critical for global stability and recovery.  
There are no easy answers, although the further examination of the top-
ics discussed in this article could yield compromises that serve to protect 
submarine cables and cable repair ships in peacetime and wartime. This arti-
cle concludes by encouraging international scholars, policy makers, and the 
cable industry to continue discussing and debating these ideas. 
